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CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION FROM THE OCTOBER 2007
TERM
Martin A. Schwartz*
INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses last term's major civil rights decisions
by dividing them into three categories: first, Section 1983 litigation;
second, retaliation cases; and third, age discrimination cases. Over-
all, it was a good year for civil rights plaintiffs, especially in the em-
ployment discrimination area.
I. SECTION 1983 LITIGATION
It was an interesting term for Section 1983 litigation, espe-
cially for those who have followed Section 1983 law stemming back
to the late 1960s. Starting in 1978 with Monell v. Department of So-
cial Services,' we see a fairly large number of decisions concerning
section 1983 litigation in almost every single term of the United
* Professor Martin A. Schwartz is a Professor of Law, Touro Law Center. B.B.A., cum
laude, City College of New York, 1966; J.D., magna cum laude, Brooklyn Law School,
1968; L.L.M., New York University School of Law, 1973. Professor Schwartz has authored
leading treatises including SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (4th ed. 2004-
2006), SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: FEDERAL EVIDENCE (4th ed. 2007), and SECTION 1983
LITIGATION: JURY INSTRUCTIONS (1999). Professor Schwartz is also the author of a bi-
monthly column for the New York Law Journal entitled, "Public Interest Law." This Article
is based on a presentation given at the Practising Law Institute's Tenth Annual Supreme
Court Review Program in New York, New York. The author expresses appreciation for the
valuable assistance of the Touro Law Review in the preparation of this Article.
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
1
Schwartz: Civil Rights Litigation from the October 2007 Term
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2009
680 TOURO LA WREVIEW [Vol. 25
States Supreme Court.2 Section 1983, of course, is a vital statute; it is
the vehicle for enforcing federal constitutional rights against state and
local officials and municipalities.3 The trend of a large number of
Section 1983 decisions within each term will continue into the Octo-
ber 2008 term. However, last term was slender in Section 1983 Su-
preme Court decisional law.
Only one Supreme Court decision can be identified as being a
hard-core Section 1983 case, Engquist v. Oregon Department of Ag-
riculture.4 This case held that public employees may not assert so-
called "class of one" equal protection claims.5 To understand the
significance of this decision, go back to 2000 when the Court decided
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech.6 In that case, Ms. Olech asked the
village for authorization to connect to the village's water supply.7
The village agreed, but in exchange, demanded that Ms. Olech give
2 See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004); Bd. of County Comm'rs of Brian
County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1997); Johnson v.
Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991); Will v. Michigan Dep't of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986); Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261 (1985); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
3 Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial ca-
pacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
4 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008).
' Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2148-49.
6 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
7 Olech, 528 U.S. at 563.
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the village a thirty-three foot easement on her property. 8 Ms. Olech
objected, stating that other property owners in the village had only
been asked to provide fifteen-foot easements. 9 She asserted an equal
protection claim under Section 1983, not on the basis discrimina-
tion-like race or gender-but alleged she was arbitrarily singled-out
by the village.'°
The Supreme Court's per curiam five-paragraph opinion held
that allegations made by an individual that she or he had been arbi-
trarily singled-out without a legitimate government interest states a
"class of one" equal protection claim without regard to the motivation
of the government officials."' When you think of the phrase "class of
one," it is almost a contradiction in terms.' 2 Nevertheless, the Olech
case has come to be recognized as the decision authorizing "class of
one" equal protection claims. You can just imagine what would fol-
low.
Predictably, large numbers of Section 1983 "class of one"
equal protection claims were asserted. Plaintiffs often have plausible
reason to think-and grounds to assert-that the government treated
them poorly, and did so by singling them out in an arbitrary fashion.
13
8 Id.
9 Id,
10 Id.
" Id. at 564-65.
12 Olech, 528 U.S. at 564 n.* (stating that "[w]hether the complaint alleges a class of one
or of five is of no consequence because we conclude that the number of individuals in a class
is immaterial for equal protection analysis"); see also Tricia M. Beckles, Class of One: Are
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs at an Insurmountable Disadvantage If They Have No
"Similarly Situated" Comparators?, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 459, 459 n. 1 (2008) (noting
that "[t]raditionally, 'class of one' refers to the ability of an individual to bring forth an equal
protection claim").
13 See Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923) (" 'The purpose
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within
2009]
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The lower federal courts were beside themselves trying to figure out
how to decide these claims. The questions became: what is Olech
going to lead to; where is this going to end? Traditional arbitrary and
capricious judicial review claims under state law were being con-
verted into equal protection claims. In the Engquist case, however,
the Ninth Circuit held that public employees may not assert "class of
one" equal protection claims, 14 and the United States Supreme Court
affirmed.' 5
The decision from the Supreme Court is significant for two
reasons. First, this decision removed public employees from the
scope of "class of one" equal protection. 16 Therefore, no matter how
arbitrary the government's decision might appear to be, a public em-
ployee may not assert a "class of one" claim, based on the theory that
government personnel decision making is inherently highly subjec-
tive and discretionary. 17 In other words, "class of one" claims come
in conflict with the way government makes personnel decisions. 8
Public employees may continue to assert equal protection claims
based on class factors like race, gender, or national origin, but not
"class of one" claims.' 9 The Engquist decision is part of a broader
trend of the Supreme Court narrowing constitutional protection for
the state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.'
(quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Twp., 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918))).
14 Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 996 (9th Cir. 2007).
15 Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2157.
16 Id. at 2148-49.
17 Id. at2154.
18 Id. at2157.
'9 Id. at 2154.
[Vol. 25
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public employees. For example, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,2 ° the Court
held that free speech retaliation claims asserted by public employees
may not be based upon employee speech pursuant to the employee's
governmental responsibilities. 21 Courts have been dismissing large
numbers of public employee retaliation claims under Garcetti.2 z This
is significant given the vast number of people who work for the gov-
ernment.
23
The Engquist decision is significant for a second reason that
goes beyond public employees. The Court's analysis indicates that
"class of one" equal protection claims will be permitted only when
the government makes a decision based upon some objective stan-
dard; for example the allegation in Olech that the village had invaria-
bly required only a fifteen-foot easement.2 4 This is another way of
saying that if the government's decision was based upon discretion or
subjective factors, the plaintiff may not assert a "class of one" equal
protection claim. This is probably what the lower federal courts were
hoping for, some way to narrow or confine the "class of one" doc-
trine.
The dissent in Engquist, by Justice Stevens, stated the Court
went too far by excluding public employees from "class of one"
20 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
21 Id. at 426.
22 See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National Security Whistle-
blowing After Garcetti, 57 AM. U. L. REv. 1531 (2008). "[Flederal law today includes abso-
lutely zero protection for employees in such [retaliation claims], and ... perhaps uninten-
tionally, Garcetti is the reason why." Id. at 1534.
23 The federal government alone employs over two million people. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT BY FUNCTION: DECEMBER 2007 (2007),
http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/apes/07fedfun.pdf.
24 See Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2153-54 (explaining the rationale of the Olech decision).
2009]
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equal protection claims.25 Justice Stevens used the metaphor that
"the Court should [have] use[d] a scalpel rather than a meat-axe. 26
This raises an interesting point in terms of equal protection analysis.
It is difficult to justify a decision by the Supreme Court stating that a
certain group of individuals-in Engquist, public employees-are to-
tally excluded from a particular type of equal protection claim. Con-
sider the constitutional rights of prisoners, who overall have quite
limited constitutional protections.27 For example, prisoners have free
speech rights, but those rights do not resemble the free speech rights
of non-prisoners. Even prisoners, however, are not totally excluded
from First Amendment protection.2 8 Therefore, from the standpoint
of doctrinal analysis, it is very hard to justify the Engquist decision.
In Justice Stevens' view, the Court should have narrowed the
"class of one" doctrine, but should not have totally excluded public
employees. In other words the Court should have held that public
employees may assert "class of one" equal protection claims, but
only under certain circumstances. The end result would likely be a
highly circumscribed remedy that public employees could continue to
assert, but with a generally false hope of success because the claim
would not likely succeed in many cases.
25 Id. at 2161 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is no compelling reason to carve arbitrary
public-employment decisions out of the well-established category of equal protection viola-
tions . ... ").
26 Id. at 2158.
27 See generally Naomi Roslyn Galtz & Michael B. Mushlin, Getting Real About Race
and Prisoner Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 27, 33 (2009) ("Through a series of sharply di-
vided decisions over the last two decades, the Supreme Court has forcefully limited the con-
ditions under which courts will recognize the violation of prisoner's rights.").
28 See, e.g., Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 225 (2001) (holding that prisoners do not pos-
sess a specially protected First Amendment right to give legal assistance to fellow prisoners).
684 [Vol. 25
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In the end, is it better to have the Supreme Court deny a rem-
edy altogether, or to have a highly circumscribed remedy? By anal-
ogy, in Section 1983 law, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff
could sue a municipality by claiming inadequate training.29 How-
ever, the standards are so excruciatingly difficult for the plaintiffs
that they win these cases fairly infrequently. 30 Considering the ex-
penditure of litigation and judicial resources, would it have been bet-
ter for the Court to hold that it is not going to recognize this claim?
Experience reveals that plaintiffs' lawyers may accept as truth that
only one out of five hundred of a particular type of claim will suc-
ceed, but nevertheless believe that they have the one winning claim.
This is not to suggest that totally excluding the remedy is the pre-
ferred solution, but only to raise the issue whether a very highly cir-
cumscribed remedy or no remedy at all is preferable.
II. RETALIATION CASES
The second category is retaliation cases. An article in the Na-
tional Law Journal stated that out of all of the discrimination claims
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"), thirty percent are retaliation claims.3 These civil rights
retaliation claims are quite significant. Some federal anti-
29 See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989).
30 See id. (holding a municipality liable for inadequate training can only be established
"where that city's failure to train reflects deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights
of its inhabitants"); see also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992)
(adding the considerations of whether the plaintiffs harm was caused by the city and
whether it violated plaintiffs constitutional rights).
31 See Tresa Baldas, Retaliation Claims 'Paralyze'Employers: As Claims Spike, Lawyers
Shift Strategy, Urge Employers to Fight Back, 31 NAT'L L.J. 4 (2008) (stating that by 2007,
retaliation claims increased by eighteen percent to 26,663).
2009] 685
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discrimination statutes have explicit prohibitions against retaliatory
conduct, such as Title VII and the Americans With Disabilities Act
("ADA"). 32  Conversely, some federal statutes prohibit discrimina-
tion, but are silent on the question of whether the statute prohibits re-
taliatory conduct. Two of the latter types of statutes were brought be-
fore the Supreme Court last term. The first involved Section 1981 of
Title 42, which prohibits intentional racial discrimination in con-
tracts,33 in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries.34 The second is part of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), which pro-
tects federal government employees against age discrimination,35 in
Gomez-Perez v. Potter.36
Significantly, in both cases the Court interpreted the federal
statutes as authorizing a cause of action for retaliation.37 In fact, in
CBOCS West, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that he was fired because he
complained about racial discrimination against a co-worker; he was
allowed to assert a retaliation claim under Section 1981.38 In CBOCS
West, Inc., the federal government's position was that Section 1981
should be interpreted to prohibit retaliation. Nevertheless, the federal
32 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West 2008) ("No ... entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hir-
ing, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.").
33 Section 1981 of Title 42 provides, in pertinent part: "All persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and en-
force contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens .... " 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
3" 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008).
35 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 provides, in pertinent part: "All
personnel actions affecting employees ... at least 40 years of age . . . shall be made free
from any discrimination based on age." 29 U.S.C.A. § 633a(a) (West 2009).
36 128 S. Ct. 1931 (2008).
37 Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1935; CBOCS, 128 S. Ct. at 1954.
31 CBOCS, 128 S. Ct. at 1954-55.
686 [Vol. 25
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government took the position in Gomez-Perez that the ADEA provi-
sions protecting federal employees from age discrimination should
not be interpreted to prohibit retaliatory conduct. 39 It seemed that the
federal government's position was that a retaliation claim should be
recognized, except when the federal government is sued, in other
words, when the defendant is the federal government.
In CBOCS West, Inc. there was a dialogue which was discon-
certing for those who believe that a retaliation cause of action is a
significant part of an anti-discrimination scheme. Justice Antonin
Scalia referred to "the bad old days," 40 referencing the days when the
Court decided such cases as Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc,41 in
which the Court would imply a retaliation claim. Then Justice Scalia
asked former Solicitor General Paul Clement, "When do you think
the bad old days ended?" Without missing a beat, the Solicitor Gen-
eral said, "the bad old days ended when you got on the Court, Mr.
Justice Scalia. ' '42 It was a terrific response. That dialogue was an in-
dicator of how Justice Scalia was going to vote.
The decisions in CBOCS West and Gomez-Perez are impor-
tant because they recognize that employer retaliation against an em-
ployee for asserting her or his rights under an anti-discrimination
statute is, in and of itself, a form of discrimination. 43 But from the
39 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, CBOCS, 128 S.
Ct. 1951 (2008) (No. 06-1431), 2008 WL 63191, at *20 n.5.
40 Transcript of Oral Argument, CBOCS, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008) (No. 06-1431), 2008 WL
446726), at *45. See also Joan Biskupic, Job Discrimination Cases Hit New Opposition,
USA TODAY, Feb. 24, 2008.
4' 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969) ("The existence of a statutory right implies the existence of
all necessary and appropriate remedies").
42 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 40, at *46. See also Biskupic, supra note 41.
41 CBOCS, 128 S. Ct. at 1961; Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1935.
2009] 687
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standpoint of statutory construction, it is plausible to envision these
decisions having gone the other way. The Court could have reasoned
that when Congress wanted to prohibit retaliation, it did so. Fortu-
nately, the Court did not take this position.
There was a new retaliation case before the Court this October
2007 term called Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville
& Davidson County.44 Vicki Crawford participated in an internal in-
vestigation of a complaint of sexual harassment made by a co-
worker.45 She was not opposing gender discrimination against her-
self or complaining about the treatment of a co-worker.46 According
to Ms. Crawford, her "reward" for cooperating with the investigation
was being fired.47 The question is whether that sequence of events
gave rise to a retaliation claim under Title VII, even though Ms.
Crawford did not claim that she herself was a victim of gender dis-
crimination? 48 The Sixth Circuit held she did not have a claim under
Title VII, but the Supreme Court reversed. 49 The Court held that Ti-
tle VII's prohibition against retaliation "extends to an employee who
speaks out about discrimination not on her own initiative, but in an-
swering questions during an employer's internal investigation" con-
cerning another employee.5
In a recent article in the National Law Journal, the author pro-
jected that the next wave of retaliation claims will involve plaintiffs
44 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
41 Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 849.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 850.
'o Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 849.
688 [Vol. 25
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alleging that because she or he made a complaint of retaliation, her or
his spouse or immediate family member was fired.5  These claims
are reerred to as so-called "third party retaliation" claims.
III. AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES
The third category is age discrimination cases. During last
term, five decisions dealt with the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act. The most important of these cases is Meacham v. Knolls
Atomic Power Laboratory.
52
In 2005, in Smith v. Jackson,53 the Court held that the ADEA
prohibits not only disparate treatment claims, but also disparate im-
pact claims. 54 Title VII is interpreted the same way. However, in Ti-
tle VII cases, where the allegation is disparate impact, the employer
has the burden of justifying the employment practice that produced
the disparate impact by showing a business necessity for the prac-
tice.55 Under the ADEA, the employer's defense is something less
than business necessity, but rather, a reasonable factor other than age
("RFOA").56
The question in Meacham was who has the burden of persua-
sion on the issue of RFOA? 57 Does the plaintiff have to show the
51 Michael Starr & Christine M. Wilson, Third-Party Retaliation, 30 NAT'L L.J. 14
(2008).
52 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008).
5' 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
14 Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.
55 Id. at 243 (distinguishing "the business necessity test, which asks whether there are
other ways for the employer to achieve its goals that do not result in a disparate impact on a
protected class, [from] the reasonableness inquiry" of the ADEA).
56 Id. at 238.
57 Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2398.
2009] 689
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employer's practice was not justified by RFOA, or is the burden on
the employer to show that the practice was justified by RFOA? In a
seven-to-one decision authored by Justice Souter, the Court in
Meacham held that RFOA is an affirmative defense; therefore, the
employer has the burden of producing evidence and persuading the
trier of fact. 58 Justice Souter said that this ruling was significant be-
cause it will be costlier and more difficult for employers to defend
against age discrimination disparate impact claims.5 9 Even so, the
Court's decision does not diminish the significance of the plaintiff
having the burden of identifying the specific employment practice
that is alleged to create the disparate impact.60
The second ADEA case is Kentucky Retirement Systems v.
EEOC.6 1 The issue here involved Kentucky's pension plan for po-
licemen, fireman, and other "hazardous position" workers. The plan
generally provides for benefits according to years of service.62 The
issue in the case arose out of a provision that allowed certain seri-
ously disabled employees to retire immediately and receive "disabil-
ity retirement" benefits. As discussed by the Court, the plan "treats
some of those disabled individuals more generously than it treats
some of those who become disabled only after becoming eligible for
retirement on the basis of their age. 63 In the ADEA claim brought
by the EEOC, the Court held that when a claim is brought under the
58 Id. at 2406. Justice Steven Breyer did not participate in the consideration or decision in
the case.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 2405 (quoting Smith, 544 U.S. at 241).
61 128 S. Ct. 2361 (2008).
62 See, e.g., Ky. Ret. Sys., 128 S. Ct. at 2364.
63 id.
690 [Vol. 25
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ADEA challenging an eligibility requirement for pension benefits,
the claim fails if the court concludes that eligibility depended upon
pension status. 64 Ultimately, the claim can only succeed if the plain-
tiff can show the employer intended to discriminate on the basis of
age.65 The bottom line is that pension plan challenges under the
ADEA are not likely to be successful.
The next ADEA case is Federal Express Corp. v.
Holowecki.66 The question in Holowecki was what constitutes the fil-
ing of a "charge"-as a term of art-under the ADEA with the
EEOC? 67 The ADEA provides that a civil case may not be filed
unless sixty days have passed after a "charge" of discrimination has
been filed with the EEOC.68 In this case, the individual filed an in-
take questionnaire with the EEOC. 69 Together with the intake ques-
tionnaire was the employee's affidavit describing the alleged dis-
crimination. 70 The Supreme Court held that the intake questionnaire
and affidavit satisfied the filing of a charge with the EEOC within the
meaning of the ADEA.7'
In the case, the Court deferred to the position of the EEOC,
stating that the EEOC's position that this was a charge under the stat-
ute was entitled to a measure of respect.72 The real significance of
64 Id. at 2370. Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for the Court. Justice Kennedy dissented,
joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Alito.
65 Id.
66 128 S. Ct. 1147 (2008).
67 Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. at 1153.
68 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d)(1) (West 2009).
69 Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. at 1153.
70 id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1158.
2009]
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this case lies in the Court's articulation that the procedural aspects of
the ADEA have to be interpreted in a way that reflects the realities of
the individuals who file charges with the EEOC.73 Specifically, these
individuals are, for the most part, (1) unrepresented; (2) lay individu-
als; (3) not highly educated; and (4) cannot be assumed to have de-
tailed knowledge of the ADEA statutes and regulations.
The decision in Holowecki articulates and reflects a strikingly
different attitude and philosophy than Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. 74 Ms. Ledbetter alleged gender discrimination in the set-
ting of her salary and salary adjustments.75 The Supreme Court held
that her Title VII claims of gender discrimination were untimely.76
Ms. Ledbetter argued that she did not have a basis for knowing that
her salary stemmed from gender discrimination. The Court's re-
sponse was that it was obligated to strictly enforce the statutory limi-
tation period.7 7 There was, however, no concern for the plight of the
employee.78
The last case is Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendel-
sohn,79 which was a highly publicized "cert. granted" case.8" The
plaintiff alleged that he had been discriminated against because of his
73 Id. (explaining that a "charge can be a form, easy to complete, or an informal document,
easy to draft").
74 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
75 Id. at 2165-66.
76 Id. at 2165.
77 Id. at 2169.
78 Congress subsequently overturned the decision in Ledbetter. See Robert Pear, Con-
gress Relaxes Rules on Suits Over Pay Inequity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at A14.
79 128 S. Ct. 1140 (2008).
80 See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Court Takes on 'Me, Too' Age Bias Case, 190 N.J.L.J. 809
(2007); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Express Skepticism in a Discrimination Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2007, at A26.
692 [Vol. 25
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age, and that his supervisor was the one who engaged in this inten-
tional age discrimination.8' In cases all over the country, when a
plaintiff says she or he has evidence that the same supervisor on other
occasions also engaged in intentional age discrimination in employ-
ment, courts have been generally receptive in allowing the plaintiff to
introduce that evidence. 2 It is "other act" evidence,83 but it is highly
probative on the question of whether the defendant intended to dis-
criminate on the basis of age on this particular occasion. Given how
difficult it is for a civil rights plaintiff to prove intentional discrimina-
tion, strong policy arguments normally favor the admissibility of this
type of evidence. On the other hand, this evidence is not automati-
cally admissible; admissibility depends on when and under what cir-
cumstances these other acts occurred.84
The press called the Mendelsohn case of the "Me, Too" evi-
dence case.85 There was a "twist" in the case. The issue was if the
"other act" evidence was admissible even though the past discrimina-
tion was by a different supervisor then the one in the instant case.
The Court in Mendelsohn held that two evidentiary issues
must be resolved in order to answer the question of admissibility.
First, is the evidence sought to be introduced relevant? The Court
81 Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. at 1143.
82 See MARTIN SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: FEDERAL EVIDENCE (4th ed. 2007).
83 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) providing, in pertinent part:
Evidence of other ... acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, how-
ever, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident ....
Id.
84 Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. at 1147.
85 See Coyle, supra note 80.
2009] 693
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said that relevancy is determined, not on the basis of per se rules, but
on a case-by-case basis.86 The Court said that "whether evidence of
discrimination by other supervisors is relevant in an individual
ADEA case is fact based and depends on many factors, including
how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiffs circumstances
and theory of the case. 87 Second, a court must determine the Rule
403 issue of whether the probative value of the evidence is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of the unfair prejudice to the defen-
dant? The Court said that this issue too should be determined, not on
the basis of per se rules, but on a case-by-case basis.88 Therefore, the
case was remanded to the lower court.89
86 Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. at 1147.
87 id.
88 Id. at 1145.
89 Id. at 1147.
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